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Cable television did not begin as a business enterprise. Initially, it was an inauspicious, 
noncommercial, community antenna service implemented in areas where reception of 
television signals was poor. The first subscription cable television business was 
established in 1950 in Lansford, Pennsylvania.1 Despite fifty years of radical changes 
in technology, which have precipitated changes in public policy and governance, cable 
TV remains a relatively infant industry. The Cable industry is now on the threshold of 
another major shift as it converges with the telephone and computer industries to create 
the “communications industry”. Fifty years ago, who would have predicted that this 
grass roots cottage industry would become one of the major building blocks of the 
Information Highway ? Tracing changes within the industry, and the government’s 
responses to these changes, may well provide some useful guidelines for this industry 
in its new incarnation. There are major challenges ahead for cable television, not the 
least of which are the loss of monopoly status and the ability to compete in a new 
regime.
This paper describes the technological environment and public policies that led 
to the current legal and regulatory frameworks. Accompanying this survey of the 
industry’s development is an analysis of the current marketplace, with comments on 
how the current regulatory structure has performed in encouraging the growth of what 
has become part of a national objective.
The Early Environment - The Interests to be Protected and the Creation of the 
Monopoly
At the outset, cable television systems were limited to the retransmission of local 
broadcast signals. Physically assembling the necessary distribution system of a series 
of antennae had very high capital costs. It was this high fixed cost which led to the 
belief that cable television was a “natural monopoly”;2 that is, an industry in which
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multi-firm production is more costly than production by a monopoly3. It was believed 
that no one would invest the necessary capital without the assurance of a privileged 
market position.
The federal government had a critical interest in ensuring the development and 
in controlling the outcome of a national communications network. This network was 
important from a security point of view, in that it kept various geographic regions in 
contact, from an economic point of view, as it created jobs and an infrastructure for the 
movement of business, and from a social point of view, as it fueled and molded 
national identity. This network had first been established by the railway companies and 
further developed by telephone and telegraph companies. Broadcasting and cable 
television seemed to fit naturally within our national infrastructure.
Access to the communication network was considered a central feature to 
success and a fundamental principle in development. In a study done by CNCP entitled 
Crisis in Canadian Telecommunications Policy and Regulation4, the authors outlined 
this public policy:
The importance of access is directly related to the importance of the major 
telecommunications systems in Canada. Access enhances the uses Canadians can make 
of their communications systems, and increases their choices as consumers and as 
citizens. It improves communications across the country and stimulates innovation in 
equipment and services. It increases business efficiency and overall economic 
efficiency. Lack of access has the opposite effect - limitation of the consumer choice, 
inefficiency within the telecommunication industry and the economy as a whole, and 
technological retardation.
How then could building be encouraged, the network be controlled and access be 
developed, protected and guaranteed to all Canadians? The response was to create 
regulatory bodies who controlled the environment through regulations, most 
importantly the power to grant authorization or licenses. Thus these bodies were 
empowered to grant licenses which were grants of exclusivity for a particular 
geographic area. With this grant came certain obligations, including the obligation to 
invest in infrastructure and provide access for the communities for which one was 
licensed.
In Canada, unlike the United States, there is an obligation to the maintenance and 
sovereignty of Canadian culture. As noted by Sidney Head5:
3 Eli Noam, “Local Distribution Monopolies” in Telecommunication Regulation Today and Tomorrow, ed 
Eli Noam. (New York: Harcourt Brae, 1983).
4 CNCP Telecommunications, Crisis in Canadian Telecommunications Policy and Regulation, (Toronto: 
CNCP Telecommunications, 1983) at 5.
5 Sidney Head, World Broadcasting Systems: a Comparative Analysis (Los Angeles: Wadsworth, 1985) 
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Canada suffers from proximity - the overwhelming presence of the United States on the 
border along which most Canadians reside. This proximity and the presence of a 
substantial linguistic minority, the French-speaking residents of Quebec province, have 
made broadcasting a subject of intense political concern in Canada Broadcasting has 
be subjected to so many earnest inquiries in Canada that one commentator called it “the 
most thoroughly scrutinized sector of cultural life.
Aside from the protection of Canadian culture, broadcasting regulations generally took 
the form of responses to entrepreneurial initiatives and political concerns.6 This 
reactionary approach to governance continues to be a characteristic of broadcasting law 
today .
The Regulatory Framework for the Monopoly
The Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) came into being on April 1, 1968 
with regulatory authority over the broadcasting undertakings and networks that 
constituted the Canadian broadcasting system, including “broadcasting receiving 
undertakings” or cable television systems. The legislation which outlined the 
framework and the rules was the Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1967-1968, c. 25. The early 
years of cablevision were governed under this Act; and, although it was updated in 
1985, it was not until 1991 that it was substantially revised. In 1974, the Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Act, R.S.C. 1974, c. 49, amended the 
Broadcasting Act, insofar as the constitution of the CRTC was concerned, but the 
powers and objectives of the Commission continued to be outlined in the Broadcasting 
Act of 1968.
Essentially , the CRTC was empowered to regulate and supervise the Canadian 
broadcasting system. This was to be done through the ability to grant licenses and, 
once, granted, the licensee was required to serve the area to which the license applied. 
The policy objectives were stated in veiy wide terms and the Commission’s licensing 
powers and powers to make regulations were to be carried out “in furtherance of these 
objects” (s. 17 and s. 16). The Commission could attach conditions to licenses (s. 17) 
which might be “considered appropriate for the implementation of the broadcasting 
policy.” Regulations could be made respecting other matters the CRTC deemed 
necessary for “the furtherance of its objects”. Besides hearing license applications, 
renewals and amendments, the Commission was also responsible for approving transfers 
of ownership of broadcasting undertakings, ensuring that those who received a license 
were known to and subject to their processes. Complaints were also a Commission 
responsibility and the CRTC kept records which could affect licensing decisions. In 
short, the CRTC was powerful, having very wide discretion and very broad control
which was seldom interfered with, even by the courts.7
Overlaying the framework were the policy objectives that the broadcasting system 
should be owned and controlled by Canadians “so as to safeguard, enrich and 
strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada”(s.3(b)). The 
issue of access was addressed through regulations imposing positive obligations to 
serve the territory for which one was licensed, and by regulating the costs of basic cable 
service.
In April 1976, the CRTC became responsible for telecommunications carriers as 
well as broadcasting, and the name of the Commission changed to the Canadian Radio­
télévision and Telecommunications Commission. In 1993 , after several unsuccessful 
attempts to enshrine telecommunications in its own legislation, the federal 
Telecommunications Act, R.S.C. 1993, c. 38, was passed. Thus, the CRTC became 
responsible for both broadcasting , under the Broadcasting Act, and telephone 
communications, pursuant to the Telecommunications Act.
The regulatory framework for broadcasting as a monopoly was fairly straight 
forward, as was the outcome of compliance or non-compliance with the rules. There 
was either license renewal or refusal. The difficulty, of course, was that the technology 
was not static, and the monopolistic framework allowed only for the continuation of 
the status quo. As pointed out by Alfred Kahn in his article “The Passing of the Public 
Utility Concept - A Reprise”, “markets in the real world cannot be classified neatly as 
monopolistic or competitive.”8
The 1970’s/80’s/90’s - Changing Technology and Changing Interests
The 1970’s began a new era for cable television. Technology made great advances in 
the area of communications, beginning with low-cost satellite transmission replacing 
terrestrial microwave networks. Assembling a terrestrial network, a collection of 
“headends” which collected local signals and distributed them through coaxial cable 
into the subscribers home was very expensive and did not provide much choice - the 
customer received only the local signals which the cable operator could receive from 
their antennas. With the advent of inexpensive satellite transmission, a cable operator’s 
headend could pick up distant signals from the satellite and distribute these additional 
signals to subscribers. The cable company paid a monthly subscription fee for these new 
channels and, in turn, charged the customer. Technology evolved so that cable
7 Re Capital Cities Communications Inc, [1975} F.C. 18; CKOYLimited v R. [1971] 1 S.C.R.2. See also 
supra note 1 at 21.
8 Alfred Kahn ‘The Passing of the Public Utility Concept - a Reprise” in Telecommunications Regulation 
Today and Tomorrow ed. Eli Noam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1983) atl8.
operators could offer a group of these services in addition to the basic packages which 
consumers had previously received. The customer could choose whether to subscribe 
and pay for these additional services, grouped together in a package called a “tier”, or 
operators could stop the flow of this “tier” of services to the home through “trapping”, 
a technique still used today.
Technology further evolved to include an electronic box installed in the 
customers home which had the ability to decode enciypted signals. Enciypted signals, 
or “pay services”, were generally movie channels or more costly types of programming 
Because this was a more expensive method of distribution, only around ten percent of 
customers would elect to receive this type of programming.
The 1980’s brought further significant technological change, the impact of which 
is still unfolding. Cable television had always been distributed through coaxial cable, 
whereas telephony relied upon paired copper wires for distribution to customers homes. 
Neither method was suitable to do the job of the other until the development of fiber­
optic technologies. This advance allowed for the distribution of video, which copper 
wire did not, and it allowed for two way traffic, which coaxial cable did not. Thus, 
these two technologies, and the two industries, began to “converge” and regard each 
other as potential competitors. In addition, digital technology began to emerge, 
conferring the ability to compress video signals so that multiple signals might be 
delivered in the same space as formerly occupied by one channel. This was the 
technological solution for the customer who desired more choice and there began to be 
talk of a 500 channel universe. At the same time, traditional boundaries began to blur 
between telephones and computers as interactivity became the norm and consumers 
began to request and expect interactivity from the cable companies.
Through other technological developments, competitors of cable television began 
to emerge in the early 1990’s. Several companies were formed in the U.S., such as 
DirecTV and USSB, which broadcast directly to the consumer, therefore eliminating the 
cable operator. Because these companies implemented digital technology they could 
offer a large number of signals. Their weakness was the cost of the hardware which 
was necessary for the consumer to receive and decode the signals. But the cost and size 
of the hardware has been decreasing, and the satellite broadcaster’s sunk costs are much 
less than those of the traditional cable distribution system. In Canada, after a great deal 
of confusion in the market place, there are currently two direct broadcasting companies, 
Star Choice and Expressvu.
A third emerging category of competitors to cable was wireless technology, 
which includes microwave multichannel distributions services (MMDS). This is a 
technology which previously existed and is somewhat limited by line of sight 
requirements for the transmission of signals. It requires a flat topography to send signals 
from antennae to antennae. However, digital compression and low cost make wireless 
technology a true competitor.
In conjunction with technological change, there were dramatic “philosophical” 
shifts in the general public. Public perception of a monopoly began to change from that 
of a benign assurance of universality to a potentially corrupt system based on pay back 
to a select few. Although the following comments predate the change in the Canadian 
market, they accurately describe the new Canadian public perception of regulated 
monopolies9:
Although these laws differed in many respects...they had one feature in common. They 
all followed the delusion that private privilege can be reconciled with public interest by 
the alchemy of public regulation. Consequently, none of them disturbed in the slightest 
degree the underlying structure of special privilege; they merely reared upon it a 
superstructure of restraint. Monopoly capitalism, secure in its privileges, shook off the 
petty irritations of regulation and continued it’s aggressions against public welfare.
This attitude, coupled with the poor public image that cable television had 
developed came to a head in 1995 when Rogers Communications Inc. , the largest 
Canadian cable company, attempted to introduce new Canadian channels by way of 
“negative option”. That is, the customer was to choose not to take the additional 
channels; otherwise, they were deemed to have chosen to receive and pay for these new 
channels. To add insult to injury, if the customer did take the positive step of informing 
the cable company that they did not wish to receive the services, the customer would 
lose som e of their preferred programming, which had now been packaged with the 
new services.
While the term “ monopoly “ become reviled, the word “competition” was 
becoming increasingly synonymous with economic prosperity, customer choice, and the 
national dream of an Information Highway. Kahn said of the US climate10:
At a time when our most pressing national economic problem seems to be a compound 
of stagflation, faltering productivity, and a threatened loss of international competitive 
position, it is not surprising that we incline increasingly to opt for the dynamic disorder 
introduced by competition, wasteful as it may be in static terms, in order to take 
advantage of the powerful pressures it exerts for innovation and the achievement of X- 
efficiencies, over the enforced orderliness that is the ideal of central planning.
To the public, competition meant choice: choice of providers, choice of services, 
choice of cost. The protection of Canadian sovereignty began to interfere with 
consumer choices and although there were, and still are, strong advocates, suspicion 
arose that a primary motivation may have been profit, rather than national identity.
9 Horace Gray, “Passing of the Public Utility Concept” cited in Alfred E. Kahn, ‘The Passing of the Public 
Utility Concept: A Reprise”, in Telecommunications Regulation Today and Tomorrow, ed. Eli. Noam (New 
York: Harcourt Brace, 1983) at 3.
10 Supra note 8 at 10.
Impact on the Framework - Moving toward Deregulation
The major changes in technology and consumer demand for choice were destined to 
impact upon the monopoly framework. In the 1980s, a series of Commissions 
attempted to address these issues, opening the skies and paving the way for competition. 
The results of these hearings included the licensing of satellite delivered specialty 
services, the creation and expansion of the Eligible Satellite Lists of services with its 
counterpart linkage requirements , the authorization of competitors, the Structural 
Hearings, and the “Information Highway” white papers.
In response to the “new consumer” who was requesting more services and more 
choices in 1983, the CRTC issued a call for applications for new Canadian specialty 
services, acknowledging the need to expand the range of services offered by cable 
television systems. After a public hearing, the Commission licensed two such services: 
Chum Limited (MuchMusic) and Action Canada Sports Limited (to become The Sports 
Network). As part of this licensing process, the Commission allowed the introduction 
of non-Canadian services as a method of marketing the Canadian services. Rules were 
made concerning “linkage”; that is, for every Canadian specialty service carried, a 
cable system was allowed to carry two non-Canadian specialty services. The allowable 
non-Canadian services were outlined on a list, the Eligible Satellite Services List. This 
was the first in a series of decisions granting Canadian Specialty service licenses. It was 
intended that services on the List would not be competitive with Canadian services. In 
fact a foreign service could lose its place on the List should a Canadian competitive 
service be licensed.
In 1987, the number of Canadian specialty channels was expanded to include 
French language services (Canal Famille, TV5, Reseau des sports, $nd Musique Plus),a 
bilingual service (the Weather Network/Meteomedia), three English language services 
(Vision, CBC Newsworld, and YTV) and one pay service, the Family Channel.11 In
1994, this number was again increased to include the Discovery Channel, The Country 
Network, Bravo!, Showcase, Life Network, The Women’s Network, two new French 
language channels, and two new pay services, Moviepix andMovieMax.12 The next 
round of licensing followed shortly thereafter, when the CRTC licensed twenty-two 
more Canadian specialty services in 1996.13 Canada was now in the “content” business 
and success was ensured through regulations concerning distribution. The Eligible 
Satellite List was consistently expanded to assist in marketing the new Canadian 
specialty channels, and the linkage ratios were reduced to a one to one ratio. While 
choice of content was expanding, so was the list of alternate suppliers. The CRTC
11 CRTC, Specialty Programming Services (2 April, 1984) Public Notice CRTC 1984-81.
12 CRTC, More Canadian Programming Choices (30 November, 1987) Public Notice CRTC 1987-260.
13 CRTC, Licensing o f New Specialty and Pay Television Services (6 June, 1994) Public Notice CRTC 1994- 
59.
allowed the introduction of Direct-to-Home (DTH) providers in 1987.14 Soon after, 
Multipoint Distribution Systems were licensed on a competitive basis.15 As well, there 
was a proliferation of “extra legal” alternatives, those being grey market dishes through 
which subscribers could receive American programming that was not on the List, such 
as HBO, Showtime and Cinemax, to name but a few.
Beginning with the Structural Public Hearing, the Commission recognized that 
technology and consumer appetites had overtaken the framework, so it attempted to 
define some features of the future communications environment, stating that the new 
environment was driven by three intersecting forces : changing technology, increasing 
competition and the “new consumer”.16 Accordingly, the CRTC felt that traditional 
forms of regulation would become increasingly ineffective and that the new focus of the 
CRTC would be regulating basic cable service to ensure accessibility and affordability, 
as well as aggressive encouragement of the production and distribution of Canadian 
programming. This decision relied to a great extent upon the advent of digital video 
compression (DCV) which would increase the capacity of cable systems, and 
addressability, which would allow the consumer to customize their choices. However, 
due to costs and lack of standardization, these technologies have not been implemented 
within the time frame predicted by the Commission.
Shortly after the Structural Public Hearing, by Order in Council PC 1994-1689, 
the government initiated a process to consult the public on the future of broadcasting 
and telecommunications, in particular respecting the issues of network interconnection, 
Canadian content, and competition. The CRTC held public hearings and reported to the 
government and to the Information Highway Advisoiy Counsel (IHAC) in May 1995. 
IHAC added it’s comments and released its report on September 27, 1995. The 
Government then published its plan to finalize the policy of convergence (Convergence 
Policy Statement August 6,1996), and the process culminated in the policy framework. 
These “White Papers”, while not having the force of law, provided the policy 
framework for future interpretation of the Broadcasting Act. That policy indicated that 
there should be17 :
14 CRTC Licensing o f New Specialty and Pay Television Undertakings (4 September, 1996) Public Notice 
CRTC 1996-120 licensed the following services: The Comedy Network, History and Entertainment;, 
Teletoon, CTV n 1 headline News, Canadian Learning Television, S3 Regional Sports, Report on Business, 
Treehouse TV, Prime TV, Space, Outdoor Life, Home and Garden Television, Star Entertainment, Pulse 
24, Sportscope Plus, MuchMoreMusic, Talk TV, Le Canal Vie, Le Canal Vie, Le Canal Nouvelles, 
Musimax, Odyssey, and SATV.
15 CRTC, Regulatory PolicyforDirect-to- Home (DTH) Satellite Broadcasting Systems (26 November,1987) 
Public Notice CRTC 1987-254. See also CRTC, Licensing o f New Direct-to-Home Satellite Distribution 
Undertakings (20 Decemeber, 1995) Public Notice CRTC 1995-217.
16 CRTC, Regulatory Policy for Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS) (3 June, 1993) Public Notice CRTC 
1993-76. See also CRTC (26 October, 1995) Public Notice CRTC 1995-183.
17 CRTC, Structural Public Hearing (3 June, 1993) Public Notice CRTC 1993-74.
an increasingly competitive and global market and the rapid pace of technological 
development, market forces, not governments, should, to the extent feasible determine 
the most appropriate standards. Where required to meet specific needs such as security, 
safety or international obligations , the Government will use its legislative and 
regulatory powers to establish and enforce standards.. As well, the Government may 
take appropriate action where competition or the interests of consumers may be 
adversely affected by standards related considerations....the Government (will) continue 
to have the tools and mechanisms to promote Canadian content.
Part of this policy was that telephone companies could compete with cable companies 
in their core business when the regulatory barriers to competition in local telephone 
services were removed.
These policies came to have the force of law in the new Broadcasting Distribution 
Regulations SOR/97-555, which became effective January 1 1998. These new 
regulations were made applicable to “distribution undertakings”, thus taking into 
account competition from DTH satellite systems, MDS and potentially, telephone 
companies. The obligation to provide service to individual households in residential 
areas within the service area was repealed and regulation of basic rates was abandoned 
where competition was considered to be effective (i.e. the loss of 5% of customers to 
a new distribution undertaking ss. 45-56). Canadian content was still protected through 
requirements to carry a majority of Canadian signals (s.6), requirements to carry certain 
programming (s. 17) ,the access rules which require companies which serve over 6000 
subscribers to carry all Canadian specialty services by 1999(s. 18), as well as distribution 
and linkage requirements (s. 20).
Section 9 of the Regulations introduced a new concept into the framework: “No 
licensee shall give an undue preference to any person, including itself, or subject any 
person to an undue disadvantage”. This section of the regulations marks a departure in 
governance and illustrates the dichotomy within the current framework. The policies 
reflected in the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations create a framework for the 
regulation of competition, which is, if not an oxymoron, at least a confusion of 
principles. The CRTC must administer government polices through regulation for the 
betterment of the Canadian communications system; but, at the same time, must 
adjudicate upon legal principles of competition without reference to extraneous issues. 
An examination of the current communications market and the most recent Commission 
decisions illustrate the difficulty of this mandate.
The Current Market - Vertical Integration
The most surprising characteristic of the new competitive marketplace is that it has not 
fundamentally changed from the monopolistic structure of the 1980s. There have been 
a great number of discussions, policies and papers but no real change, at least not yet.
This is because the assets which form the backbone of the communications industry are 
still concentrated in the hands of a few, except now control is achieved through vertical 
integration rather than exclusive licensing.
Insofar as “broadcasting distribution undertakings or BDU’s” (the new name for 
all types of distributors) are concerned, Rogers Communications Inc. has invested in 
businesses of related technology, in particular telephony, paging and Internet services. 
Shaw Communications Inc., the second largest BDU, has invested more heavily in 
programming and owns YTV, Country Music Television and Treehouse programming 
services. Shaw also owns a digital Music service known as DMX, as well as equity in 
Telelatino Network, The Comedy Network, and Teletoon. In addition, Shaw has 
invested in alternative methods of distribution and owns Star Choice. Shaw has also 
invested in the assets of Western International Corporation (WIC) which has substantial 
broadcasting assets and radio stations. This purchase is still is subject CRTC approval. 
Videotron, the largest francophone operator, is investing in telephony, and has interests 
in francophone programming services such as TVA, for which the CRTC has recently 
mandated carriage throughout Canada. Other cable operators, such as Moffatt 
Communications (owners of Women’s Television Network) have pursued this strategy, 
although to a somewhat lesser extent due to capital issues.
There are some very powerful programming services which have no cable 
distributor affiliation, but their numbers are few and ownership is concentrated. A 
recent merger means that Alliance Atlantis Broadcasting owns Life Network, Home 
and Garden Television, Showcase Television and the History Channel, among other 
assets. The Astral Group owns virtually all the movie networks, French and English, 
in Canada. CTV, another major player, owns CTV Network, CTN News, Talk TV and 
parts ofCTV Sports Network and Outdoor Life Network. Pending regulatory approval, 
CTV will acquire Netstar Communications Group, the company that owns The Sports 
Network (TSN), as well as the Discovery Channel. CanWest Global has Global 
Network as well as the specialty Service, Prime TV, and will share in the division of the 
WIC assets with Shaw. With Chum Group Ltd. (Much Music, Bravo!, Space, et al) and 
CBC interests (Newsworld, RDI, Galaxie) and Radiomutuel for francophone services, 
this sums up the Canadian industry. While the assets are certainly swapping with greater 
frequency, the players stay much the same. Broadcasting is a small world.
What does all this mean to the regulatory framework? While vertical integration 
is not the antithesis of competition in an industry changing from a monopoly to 
competitive environment, it may stunt the process if unchecked. This brings us back 
to the new Broadcasting Distribution Regulations and section 9 referred to earlier, 
which has the title “Undue Preference or Disadvantage”. This regulation has been 
invoked at least three times of note since its inception only 12 months ago.
When Shaw Communications Inc. attempted to increase its holdings in 
Sportscope Television Network Ltd. the Commission denied the application, stating
that market conditions with respect to channel capacity and competition had not 
materialized to the extent anticipated, and that there was potential for undue preference, 
in that Shaw might prefer its own services and give them distribution over other 
programming services.18 Similarly, the Commission refused to allow Rogers to increase 
its stake in CTV SportsNet on the basis there was concern regarding the potential for 
undue preference19 (Appeal to the Federal Court denied April 7,1999). A complaint by 
Bell Expressvu was dismissed as not being an undue preference by the Commission. 
Expressvu had alleged that Rogers preferred itself by obtaining an exclusive deal with 
a signal supplier to distribute NFL Sunday Ticket.20
With the advent section 9 of the Regulations, the CRTC is no longer simply 
implementing policies and policing administrative issues. Rather, it is now called upon 
to make judicial determinations. The CRTC is acting as a court, and adjudicating on the 
basis of legal principles. On the other hand, the Commission is still intended as a forum 
to canvass public opinion and act on the policies of the government of the day.
Conclusion
Historically, the Commission has been the body that implemented government policies 
which were outlined in regulations. They worked on an informal, consultative basis, 
encouraging input from all sources, pursuing inquires and involving Commission staff 
in regulatory determinations and implementation. With the introduction of competitive 
issues, and regulations such as section 9 of the Broadcasting Regulations, this procedure 
is no longer possible. There is too much room for abuse of power, or at least a claim of 
such conduct. Justice must not only be done but be “seen to be done”, meaning the 
implementation of clear and predetermined procedures to safeguard rights and ensure 
natural justice. And this does not take into account the role of the Bureau of 
Competition Policy: Will that government body leave all broadcasting issues to the 
CRTC or will there be two bodies who govern competition in the communications 
field?
All of the above objectives, national and social interests, and the benefits of competition 
in creating the Information Highway, are laudatory but schizophrenic, at least for one 
governmental body. In a fashion that is distinctly Canadian, we are looking for the 
protection of social principles and the benefits of a competitive environment, wanting 
to have our cake and eat it too, so to speak. There is currently an uneasy alliance of 
principles, resulting in a framework which is still in an uncomfortable state of flux. 
Canadians may have to decide which interests are the most important to protect and
11 Government of Canada Convergence Policy Statement, August 6,1996.
19 CRTC Decision 98-226.
20 CRTC Decision 98-487.
what structure most efficiently and effectively protects those interests. Failing such a 
pro-active determination, the framework of the industry will continue be determined by 
technology , entrepreneurial initiatives and mixture of policies which makes for 
unpredictable and potentially unfair governance.
